Sunday, September 1, 2013

Towards a Marxist Definition of Play

                 “Surely by now we know what play is: what it means, when it happens;
                                     what it means when it happens.”[i] - Pat Kane

What is it to play? So elusive is the concept that “there has been a considerable disagreement about the essential characteristics of play as distinguished from any other type of activity.”[ii] Such complexity led Huizinga to conclude that play “is not susceptible of exact definition either logically, biologically, or aesthetically.”[iii] Yet attempt a definition he does, and more than sixty years later his analysis remains worthy of consideration:
“Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite consciously outside “ordinary” life as being “not serious”, but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes the formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguise or other means.”[iv]
Such a comprehensive inventory of features presents its own problems. As Roger Caillois aptly remarks, “Such a definition, in which all the words are important and meaningful, is at the same time too broad and too narrow.”[v] Of the list, the claim that play is a free activity stands out most clearly. Indeed, Huizinga considers it to be the primary characteristic, arguing that “[f]irst and foremost, then, all play is a voluntary activity… By this quality of freedom alone, play marks itself off from the course of the natural process.”[vi]
What is this freedom? Burke suggests play is “free from both inner and external compulsion.”[vii] Thus, in part, play is marked by a freedom from biological necessity; equally it is freedom from external (i.e. social) pressure. If someone is forced or coerced into participation then they can no longer be said to be playing: “One plays only if and when one wishes to. In this sense, play is free activity”.[viii]
Play also demonstrates a separation from our normal lives, being “‘played out’ within certain limits of time and place. It contains its own course and meaning.”[ix] Callois adds that such limits are “defined and fixed in advance”.[x] Moreover, Huizinga argues that “play is not “ordinary” or “real” life. It is rather a stepping out of “real” life into a temporary sphere of activity with a disposition all of its own”[xi] presenting itself as an “intermezzo, an interlude in our daily lives.”[xii] For Freud the “opposite of play is not what is serious but what is real.”[xiii] It is also possible to say, inversely, that ‘real life’ may not impinge upon our play world, a world that places high emphasis on imagination and make believe. Within this “pure space” we experience a “special awareness of a second reality or of a free unreality, as against real life”.[xiv]
The quality that encapsulates play more than any other is its sheer pointlessness. Anthony Giddens points out that the “majority of interpretations seem to stress one fundamental characteristic of play, as differentiated from any other sort of behaviour namely, that play is activity which is by and large non-instrumental in character.”[xv] Such an interpretation stresses two main points. Firstly, that play is an end in itself, performed for no other reason than to partake in it; as Guttmann says, “Play is autotelic”.[xvi] Secondly it is characterised by the fact that “it creates no wealth or goods”.[xvii] These two strands are synthesised and given their clearest expression in Carl Diem’s succinct assessment: “Play is purposeless activity, for its own sake, the opposite of work.”[xviii] That play represents the antithesis of work is taken as self-evident and dominates much of the writing on the subject. Caillois extends the argument, pointing to the waste that play represents:
“Nothing has been harvested or manufactured, no masterpiece has been created, no capital has accrued. Play is an occasion of pure waste: waste of time, energy, ingenuity, and often of money for the purchase of gambling equipment or eventually to pay for the establishment”.[xix] 
Additions may be made to the list. For instance we might claim that play is often typified by its spontaneity, and add that it lies outside of morality.[xx] But as a phenomenon so varied in its manifestations one must be more specific about abstracting in order to define. The standard definitions of play stress three tenets, essential characteristics apparent in whatever form it takes:
  • Play is freedom. Specifically, play is the freedom from internal and external compulsion.
  • Play is an activity pursued for its own sake. Play is autotelic.
  • Play is separate from reality.

It would appear that a picture of play has been painted of which the broadest brush strokes of definition may be agreed upon. Yet so elusive is the play-concept that even the most fundamental assumptions are open to critique. Of these the idea that play is activity pursued for its own end is paramount. Theorists from across the spectrum have all used the idea of play as being in some capacity non-utilitarian or autotelic as the theoretical underpinning for their writings on the subject. However even a brief examination of one’s own play experience will immediately refute this “deceptively simple paradigm”.[xxi] The moment the question of intent is considered the notion of play as autotelic is unavoidably negated. So obvious is this argument that Guttmann is compelled to recognise it immediately following his definition, saying, “In the real world motives are mixed”.[xxii] People play for a multitude of different reasons: to socialise with friends and family, to exercise, to break up domestic or work routines, as well as the enjoyment it brings.
One may certainly sympathise with Guttmann’s protestation that the autotelic “paradigm is a way to understand social reality, not a perfect replica for whatever is.”[xxiii] In his defence one might recall Goethe’s aphorism that, “Theory is grey my friend, but ever green is the tree of life”.[xxiv] The model’s simplicity may allow a “higher degree of clarity to analyses than has typically been the case in the past”.[xxv] However acknowledging the unavoidable gap between life as lived and necessary theoretical abstractions is not the same as accepting a flawed theory constantly refuted by experience.
Yet there remains something seductive about the autotelic/non-utilitarian analysis. It does seem to approximate to the essence of play, touching on its transient and ephemeral quality. Undoubtedly its appeal is due, at least in part, to the fact that it articulates the “common-sense dichotomy”[xxvi] between work and play. If work “consists in (a) instrumental activity, undertaken (b) within a framework of direct or indirect economic obligation”[xxvii] then play is “essentially non-productive activity”.[xxviii] Play is its own reward. Moreover, when distinguishing between play and work, we can say that the former is fun whilst the latter is not; play is to be enjoyed, work is to be endured. It “is precisely this fun-element that characterizes the essence of play”.[xxix] Yet the picture is more nuanced than the simple play/work dichotomy would have us believe:
“Although we can conceptualise a universe in which the utilitarian and nonutilitarian are totally compartmentalized, in which work and play are distinct realms which never interpenetrate, we often experience work and play in their impure forms.”[xxx] 
Lastly it must be recognised that the assumed division between play and work is in large part predicated on a specific notion of the nature of work, one where drudgery is an inevitable and unchangeable condition of our labour. Even Marxists who would normally reject such ideas as ahistorical find themselves drawing similar conclusions. Rigauer falls into this trap before offering a necessary corrective in an afterword, urging us to “recognize that we are dealing with a historically determined kind of work - that of industrial capitalism with all its life-disturbing effects.”[xxxi] Obviously work throughout history may be seen as laborious, difficult and sometimes dangerous, but it is also possible to see that labour has the potential to be a creative and life-affirming activity. If one does not mistake human labour per se for its socially and historically determined form then the assumptions upon which the non-utilitarian theory of play rests so heavily are seriously undermined.
The question of freedom in play would seem difficult to critique. There is however one important area into which theorists have neglected to extend their analysis - the question of whether we are free to create the conditions, forms and rules of play. It is true that in many areas of play - in particular those examples of organised play such as games and sport - one must freely submit to rules (written or unwritten) in order to participate. Yet the purest forms of play are marked by the ability of the players to freely decide how the play will develop, how its narratives will unfold. It is possible for children playing doctors and nurses to suddenly transform into firefighters, or face a hoard of jelly monsters or let everyone in the hospital die. The internal logic of play is beholden to nothing other than the whims of those who play. It is the unwillingness to place creative freedom at the heart of the theory of play that weakens much writing on the subject.
The separateness of play is open to diverse interpretation. It is one thing to acknowledge that play often takes place in a specific area and that it is marked by an element of make-believe, however, taken literally, the statement makes little sense. A fair proportion of a person’s leisure time may consist of playing. For a child, play is one of the initial sensory interactions with the world and is crucial to cognitive and physical development.[xxxii] In both cases play can be seen as occupying an important place in the world of young and old alike, and “as Simmel points out, all play has definite links with reality, however ‘detached’ it may be in other respects.”[xxxiii] In fact this characteristic is an extension of the non-utilitarian argument. Play does not help to reproduce the conditions of our existence playing no part in the provision of food, clothing or shelter and is, therefore, in this sense, a separation from reality. As such, the ‘separateness of play’ is the quasi-mystical cloak helping to mask play’s relationship to labour.
Thus in standard discourse, play presents as a somewhat confusing phenomenon. In the absence of an exact definition a theoretical line of best fit has been drawn through play’s innumerable contradictions. But in order to understand play one should not attempt to resolve these contradictions, rather embrace them. It is possible to arrive at a more meaningful and insightful definition of play using the concepts of use value and alienation.
It would be useful to outline the Marxist concepts employed in this work. The work of Karl Marx is often misinterpreted (sometimes wilfully) by both supporters and critics alike. So infuriated was Marx by such distortions during his own lifetime that he declared, “I, at least, am not a Marxist”.[xxxiv] Such problems are, alas, to be found in contemporary sports history also. For instance, Allen Guttmann dismisses the idea of alienation arguing, “the allegations of alienation in sports have been hyperbolic.“[xxxv] Subsequently Guttmann takes his misreading of Marx to its logical conclusion:
“If sport in general is repressive, alienating and apathy-inducive, which is the Neo Marxist thesis, then we must conclude that the ruling class of modern society has decided to alienate itself rather than those whom they must oppress.”[xxxvi] 
This caricature misrepresents Marx’s theory of alienation. [xxxvii] In the first instance he assumes that distinct classes in society experience alienation in a similar manner. He also fails to fully appreciate the main thrust of Marx’s theory. Guttmann’s underlying assumption, it seems, is that alienation is simply a state of mind, an emotional mixture of ennui and disenchantment. For Marx, alienation is not primarily a psychological issue although Marx goes to great lengths to outline the misery that alienation so often engenders.[xxxviii] The theory of alienation is instead an expression of definite social relations, rooted in social reality. It argues that the central aspect of humanity’s nature is the capacity to consciously labour, and that alienation is the loss of control over one’s labour. Marx is explicit in his formulation: “What then constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature”.[xxxix]Alienation is thus rooted not in individual psychology but in “the relation of labour to the act of production in the labour process”.[xl] In addition it is constituted by the loss of the objects which “labour produces - labour’s product,” which now confront the worker “as something alien, as a power independent of the producer.”[xli] Our labour power is sold to another who employs it in whatever way they see fit. Some workers will experience a greater degree of autonomy than others but the fact remains, that wage labour leads to alienation. [xlii]
Such a reading of Marx is contentious, even amongst Marxists.[xliii] A standard assessment of Marx’s theory would suggest that so deep-rooted is alienation in contemporary society, and so widespread are its effects, that no sphere of human endeavour is exempt from its reach. Judy Cox argues that, “Our attempts to express the creativity of which capitalism has deprived us cannot negate the totality of alienation… Lifestyles and leisure activities cannot liberate us from alienation, or even create little islands of freedom in an ocean of alienation.”[xliv]
John Molyneux has, however, produced a convincing argument detailing the way in which art may be seen as the product of unalienated labour. As the artist has complete control over the way in which they produce their artworks they do not face their “own activity as an alien activity not belonging to [them].”[xlv] Rather the creativity commonly denied people in their labour is set free. Referencing Marx’s summary of the effects of alienation[xlvi] he forcefully demonstrates how artistic production stands in stark contrast to alienated labour:
“Do any or all of these primary characteristics of alienated labour apply to artistic work? Plainly they do not. Michelangelo was sculpting, carving marble, to within four days of his death at the age of 89. Was this for the money? Not at all. Was it work in which he denied himself or was mentally debased? The opposite is the case. Was it 'imposed forced labour' or labour 'avoided like the plague' in the absence 'of physical or other compulsion'? Absolutely not… Was this alienated labour or was this because painting was essential to his being? The answer is obvious.”[xlvii]
None of this means that artists are immune from the feelings of alienation, nor does it negate the possibility of an artist exploring the concept through their wok. What is does do is return the question of alienation to Marx’s original conception, namely that alienation is the loss of control over one’s own creative process. We may conclude then that whilst “under capitalism the majority of labour and the characteristic form of labour is alienated wage labour but this does not make all labour under capitalism alienated.”[xlviii] The deployment of the term use value provokes far less debate.[xlix] For Marx, It signifies nothing other than that a particular item is in some way useful:
“The utility of a thing makes it a use value. But this utility is not a thing of air. Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, it has no existence apart from that commodity. A commodity, such as iron, corn, or a diamond, is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use value, something useful”[l]
Despite Marx’s choice of examples it is clear that services also constitute use values, therefore a physical object need not be created. Indeed use values may be created without necessarily creating commodities. We can say that use values are created by conscious human activity in order to satisfy a particular need, and we can add that these needs may be socially and historically determined, changing over time and with one’s circumstance. [li]
Having explored both concepts, it is possible to deploy them in a new definition of play. We may say that play is the unalienated, simultaneous production and consumption of use value. Such a formulation helps us to surpass the established definition in a number of ways. By defining play as a use value we recognise it as fulfilling a human need. As Leon Trotsky notes, “The longing for amusement, diversion and fun is the most legitimate desire of human nature.”[lii] Whether this need for play is an innate biological drive or socially and historically conditioned is unimportant, the fact is that the want for pleasure and excitement exists. That this creative drive should manifest itself in so many forms is an indicator of humanity’s ingenuity and inventiveness. It is, therefore, possible to see how play is the creation of use value:
“Whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of his own labour, creates, indeed, use values, but not commodities. In order to produce the latter, he must not only produce use values, but use values for others, social use values.”[liii]
By stating that play is an unalienated activity one is able to incorporate and transcend the quality of freedom as previously outlined. Rather than limiting the question of freedom to whether one chooses to play or not, it encompasses the freedom of the players to create and control their play environment. Either individually or collectively people choose how they play; there are no structures delimiting play’s potentiality, nor are managers and supervisors issuing instructions as to the players’ conduct. Furthermore the separation of producer from product, a key feature of alienation, is missing as play belongs immediately and irrevocably to the players.
As the theory of alienation helps to elucidate the shortcomings of the idea of freedom so considering play as the simultaneous production and consumption of use values allows us to overcome the limitations of the autotelic model. Play is still seen as an end in itself, but this definition allows one to avoid being caught in the theoretical trap of the players’ intentions. Equally it renders as redundant the notion that play is an essentially non-instrumental activity. Instead play differentiates itself from other spheres of human activity not so much through what is (or is not) produced but in the way it is consumed. Here the very act of production is the act of consumption. In a dialectical sense they occupy the same moment. Labour produces use values that may be consumed at some indeterminate point in the future but in play, production and consumption occur simultaneously. The very act of playing is the satisfaction of the need to play.
This new definition has implications for our understanding of the relationship between play and other spheres of human activity. It allows us to view the presence of play in such realms as science or mathematics without affording it a position of primacy.[liv] It also demystifies the relationship between play and art, allowing us to reject the oversimplification that the “fine arts have all the characteristics of play”.[lv] We may say that both represent forms of unalienated human activity[lvi] characterised by the free play of expression and imagination, but their difference is best understood in terms of production and consumption. Play is ephemeral, disappearing the moment it ceases, whilst art is tangible and ‘real’, its use values existing in perpetuity.
The most fundamental implication is that it re-draws the boundaries between work and play. No longer are they to be considered polar opposites, instead they share a profound connection, while at the same time retaining distinct and separate identities. Both represent the production of use values and, as such, both fulfill human needs. Viewed in such a way play and labour may no longer be considered counter-concepts. Instead their true relationship is hidden behind a form of labour, marked by its relentless drudgery appearing as the opposite of play. Obscured by social and historical factors it is no wonder that the idea of both play and labour being born from the same human impulse to consciously create should seem so alien. But it is imperative to state that whilst they share a more intimate connection than commonly suggested, they follow divergent paths. It would be wrong to follow Marcuse who “conceptualizes socialist freedom as the possibility of freedom within necessity, the convergence of work and play.”[lvii] In a socialist society labour would be unalienated, undertaken as much for its own sake as for the production of goods and services. To this extent work and play would indeed converge. Alexos also assumes such an outcome when he rhetorically asks, “With labour in the customary sense of the term abolished as labour, would not the continuous and multiform productive activity of men then be of the order of play?”[lviii] Jim Riordan sees this tendency also in Marx’s own writings:
“Whether games-playing contained its own justification within itself or whether its value was to be sought in ulterior ends was not a question specifically raised by Marx. The Marxist vision of the future, however, does seem to imply that work and physical recreation will merge, or that work will be elevated to the plane of recreation by the removal of the yokes of specialisation and compulsion. But Marx evidently did not envisage recreation under communism as simply games — rather as a fusion of work-like activities with play. In this, he affirmed a principal criterion of playful activities, namely, that they are freely chosen and are pursued for their inherent pleasure rather than for practical results.”[lix]
Yet Marx did reference play, if only briefly. While critiquing the Utopian Socialism of Charles Fourier he stressed that “[l]abour cannot become play, as Fourier would like.”[lx] A future socialist society would be one “in which labour would become travail attractive the self-realisation of the individual, which in no way means that it would become mere fun, mere amusement, as Fourier in a grissette-like naivety conceives it. Truly, free work, e.g. composing, is at same time precisely the most damnable earnestness, the most intense effort.”[lxi] Here, work and play are distinct activities sharing, at root, a potential for artistry and invention and at points it may be possible to view the two phenomena as moving closer together. This does not mean that work would become play, but (unalienated) labour would be a positive experience, which is why Marx could write, “labour would be a free manifestation and an enjoyment of life”.[lxii] This new definition of play, far more so than Huizinga’s conservative capitulation in conflating the ludic with the competitive, advances us to a position where we truly agree with Plato who “understood creativity as play.”[lxiii]
[i] Kane, P., The Play Ethic (London: Macmillan, 2004), p3
[ii] Giddens, A., “Notes on the Concepts of Play and Leisure”, The Sociological Review, 12, 1 (1964), p73
[iii] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p7
[iv] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p13
[v] Caillois, R., Man, Play and Games (Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p4
[vi] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p7
[vii] Burke, R., “’Work’ and ‘Play’” in Ethics, 82, 1 (1971), p38
[viii] Caillois, Man, Play and Games, p7
[ix] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p9 
[x] Caillois, Man, Play and Games, p9
[xi] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p8
[xii] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p9
[xiii] Sigmund Freud quoted in Gay, P., The Freud Reader (London: Vintage, 1995), p437
[xiv] Caillois, Man, Play and Games, p10
[xv] Giddens, “Notes on the Concepts”, pp.73-89
[xvi] Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p3
[xvii] Caillois, Man, Play and Games, p5
[xviii] Carl Diem, cited in Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p3
[xix] Caillois, Man, Play and Games, pp5-6.
[xx] On the question of play and morality see Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p6.
[xxi] Rader, B. G., “Modern Sports: In Search of Interpretations”, Journal of Social History, 13, 2 (1979), pp.307-21
[xxii] Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p3
[xxiii] Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p4
[xxiv] Goethe, J., Faust, The Tragedy: Part One (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1974), p64
[xxv] Rader, “Modern Sports”, p314
[xxvi] Burke, “’Work’ and ‘Play’”, p35
[xxvii] Giddens, “Notes on the Concepts”, p81
[xxviii] Giddens, “Notes on the Concepts”, p74
[xxix] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p3
[xxx] Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p13 
[xxxi] Rigauer, Sport and Work, pp.108-109
[xxxii] See for example, Sutton-Smith, B. “The Role of Play in Cognitive Development” in Herron, R.E. & Sutton-Smith, B., (eds), Child’s Play, (London: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), pp 252-260
[xxxiii] Giddens, “Notes on the Concepts”, p82
[xxxiv] Cited in Wheen, F., Karl Marx (London: Fourth Estate, 2000), p1
[xxxv] Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p76
[xxxvi] Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p79
[xxxvii] This particular weakness is identified in Gruneau, R. “Freedom and Constraint: The Paradoxes of Play, Games, and Sports”, Journal of Sports History, 7, 3 (1980), p81. In fairness to Guttmann he does offer something of an academic mea culpa in an afterword written in 2004. See Guttmann, From Ritual to Record, p168 
[xxxviii] Marx, K., Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1977), pp65-66
[xxxix] Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p65
[xl] Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p66
[xli] Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p63
[xlii] I would assume that the average lecturer in sports history will have a greater degree of control over their working practices than a call centre worker. However this does not negate the fact that both experience alienation.
[xliii] For a debate between Marxist writers on the question of unalienated labour see: Molyneux, J., “The Legitimacy of Modern Art”, International Socialism Journal, 80 (1998), pp71-102; Nineham, C., “Art and Alienation: A Reply to John Molyneux”, International Socialism Journal, 82 (1999), pp75-82; Molyneux, J., “Art, Alienation and Capitalism – A Reply to Chris Nineham”, International Socialism Journal, 84 (1999), pp133-42; Harman, C., “Comment on Molyneux on Art”, International Socialism Journal, 85 (1999), pp153-57
[xliv] Cox, J., “An Introduction to Marx’s Theory of Alienation”, International Socialism Journal, 79 (1998) p60. The fact that capitalism produces the structural limitations on people’s engagement with play is also found in Lefebvre, H., Critique of Everyday Life (London: Verso, 1991). In it he warns, “If we push too far we run the risk of forgetting that there can be alienation in leisure just as in work.” This is, however, fundamentally different from denying creative control to people when they actually are at play. This work stresses that the questions of primary importance are not when and where, but how and why.
[xlv] Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, p66
[xlvi] Marx, 1844 Manuscripts, pp65-66. The quote in full reads as follows: “What constitutes the alienation of labour? First, that the work is external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature; and that, consequently, he does not fulfil himself in his work but denies himself, has a feeling of misery rather than well-being, does not develop freely his mental and physical energies but is physically exhausted and mentally debased. The worker, therefore, feels himself at home only during his leisure time, whereas at work he feels homeless. His work is not voluntary but imposed, forced labour. It is not the satisfaction of a need, but only a means for satisfying other needs. Its alien character is clearly shown by the fact that as soon as there is no physical or other compulsion it is avoided like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of self sacrifice, of mortification. Finally, the external character of work for the worker is shown by the fact that it is not his own work but work for someone else, that in work he does not belong to himself but to another person”.
[xlvii] Molyneux, “Art, Alienation and Capitalism”, p135
[xlviii] Molyneux, “Art, Alienation and Capitalism”, p135
[xlix] The French post-modernist Jean Baudrillard has critiqued Marx’s position on the question of use values. For an overview of the argument see: Lee, M.J., Consumer Culture Reborn: The Cultural Politics of Consumption (London: Routledge, 1993), chapter 1.
[l] Marx, K., Capital Volume 1 (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p126
[li] Human labour is not the only source of use values, they are also found in nature. See, Marx, K., “Critique of the Gotha Programme” in Feuer, L.S. (ed.), Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), pp.153-74
[lii] Leon Trotsky, cited in Riordan, J., “Worker Sport Within a Worker State: The Soviet Union”, in Kruger, A. & Riordan, J. (eds), The Story of Worker Sport (Leeds: Human Kinetic, 1996), p57
[liii] Marx, Capital, p131
[liv] Burke, “’Work’ and ‘Play’”, p47
[lv] Burke, “’Work’ and ‘Play’”, p46
[lvi] Molyneux, “The Legitimacy of Modern Art”, pp71-102
[lvii] Hearn, F., “Toward a Critical Theory of Play”, Telos, 30 (Winter, 1976-77), p148
[lviii] Axelos, K., Alienation, Praxis and Technē in the Thought of Karl Marx (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), p313
[lix] Riordan, J., “Marx, Lenin and Physical Culture“, available at “ (accessed 17 August 2011)
[lx] Marx, K., Grundrisse, available at (accessed 17 August 2011)
[lxi] Marx, Grundrisse, available at (accessed 17 August 2011)
[lxii] Marx quoted in Hoberman, J.M., Sport and Political Ideology (London: Heinemann, 1984), p31
[lxiii] Huizinga, Homo Ludens, p162